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The Accounting Cycle
Parsing the Words of Edward Yingling
Op/Ed

January 2009 Edward L. Yingling is president and CEO of the American Bankers Association. Because of his credentials, when Yingling speaks about accounting for banks, we want to hear what he says. But, that does not necessarily imply that we shall believe what he says, because he is as partisan as a staunch Democrat or Republican.



Writing in the American Spectator, Yingling in his title claims, “Improve Accounting Standards, Improve the Economy.”  While accounting has deficiencies, I believe that his title and indeed his article greatly exaggerates the situation.  The recession has been caused by the greed and the incompetence of bankers in the subprime markets, the ill-conceived securitizations that passed on hidden risks to investors, the foolish derivatives created with unknown risks to their creators, and the concomitant lies told in financial reports.

Yingling begins with the usual bug-a-boo: “Mark-to-market accounting is contributing to uncertainty in the markets…”  The truth is mark-to-market accounting is revealing the uncertainty in the markets.  Without these fair values, some investors, most regulators, and all members of Congress would not have a clue to the up-and-down nature of risky securitizations and speculative derivatives.  With these fair value measurements—however rough the estimates—investors and regulators and members of Congress have some insight into what managers are up to.

Yingling asserts that “overly strict application of mark-to-market made the crisis much worse by creating a downward spiral of valuations based on prices in dysfunctional markets.”  This proposition is incorrect for two reasons.  First, the FASB does not require the use of market prices when markets become dysfunctional.  It allows firms to employ Level 3 estimates that rely upon present value and other models if they provide better estimates.  I suggest Yingling actually read FAS 157 so he can better understand what it says.

Second, other factors were at play to cause the downward spiral of prices, including banks’ refusing to extend loans to other banks, refusing to purchase low-quality investments from other banks, and refusing to participate in risky securitizations.  Instead of causing or even contributing to the economic decline, fair value accounting did its job by supplying various users with the information they needed to assess risky loans, low-quality investments, and questionable securitizations.  It was the risky loans, low-quality investments, and questionable securitization that led to the downward spiral, not the information that revealed the truth.

Yingling attempts to bolster his argument by saying that Congress “recognized the need to replace mark-to-market accounting.”  Congress has not passed any legislation, so the recognition took place only for a few members of Congress.

The statement that there has been “unprecedented debate among legislators” is untrue.  Every time good accounting principles threaten managers with a requirement to reveal some truth that managers would prefer to hide, there is an “unprecedented debate.”  Just ask Christopher Cox who, when a representative from California, sponsored several pieces of legislation for corporations to do away with threatening accounting, as long as the firms provided sufficient contributions to his campaign fund.

Yingling goes on to state that the “lending and investment model of banks is based on cash flows rather than market value.”  What does this statement mean?  Market values are merely discounted future cash flows, so how can he distinguish them so cavalierly?

He adds, “Some tough lessons have been learned in this environment regarding the lack of reliability and relevance of mark-to-market accounting.”  This is not quite true.  We should amend Yingling’s statement so that it indicates that we have learned that banks did not provide very good fair value measurements nor adequate and complete disclosures until the derivatives and the securitizations flopped and fair value measurements were required and auditors assured us that they were reliable and relevant.  Once these new measurements were revealed, the investment community learned the truth.  Currently, there are some interesting class action lawsuits brought by investors against banks and bank managers, so we shall explore these issues in much greater detail in the courts.

Now I have a question for Mr. Yingling.  If the ABA and its member banks are so dead set against fair value accounting, how do you explain their actions with respect to the fair value option?  Recall that FAS 159 allowed banks and other business enterprises the option of switching from historical cost accounting to fair value accounting on many of assets and liabilities.  Virtually all large banks opted to make this switch for some of their assets and some of the liabilities, as discussed in Keoun’s article cited below.  Why did they choose fair value accounting if it is so unreliable and so irrelevant?

Song’s paper, cited below, investigates this question.  His research finds evidence that bankers adopted fair value measurements to report higher earnings and to exploit a transitional adjustment that allowed them not to report losses.  In short, bankers were opportunistic when switching from historical cost to fair value accounting.  Clearly, the unreliability and irrelevance of fair value measurements did not stop them from reporting larger earnings.

I conclude that the real reason that Yingling desires to “improve accounting standards” is because fair value measurements now have induced losses on the income statements.  If fair value accounting produced gains for the banks, it is clear that bank managers and the American Bank Association would not be complaining about the conceptual underpinnings of fair value measurements.

Reliability and relevance are merely rhetorical tools in Yingling’s argument.  Bankers like fair value accounting when it reports gains, but change colors when it reports losses.  Self-interest is alive and well in the U.S. financial sector.


REFERENCES

Chang Joon Song. “An Evaluation of FAS 159 Fair Value Option: Evidence from the Banking Industry.”  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279502>.
Bradley Keoun.  “Wall Street Says -2 + -2 = 4 as Liabilities Get New Bond Math.”  Bloomberg.  June 2, 2008.  <http://morningbull.blog.tdg.ch/media/00/01/49580857.pdf>.
Edward L. Yingling.  “Improve Accounting Standards, Improve the Economy.”   American Spectator.  December 11, 2008. <http://spectator.org/archives/2008/12/11/improve-accounting>.

This essay reflects the opinion of the author and not necessarily the opinion of The Pennsylvania State University.


This essay reflects the opinion of the author and not necessarily the opinion of The Pennsylvania State University.

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J. EDWARD KETZ is accounting professor at The Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Ketz's teaching and research interests focus on financial accounting, accounting information systems, and accounting ethics. He is the author of Hidden Financial Risk, which explores the causes of recent accounting scandals. He also has edited Accounting Ethics, a four-volume set that explores ethical thought in accounting since the Great Depression and across several countries. He is the co-author of a monograph, Fair Value Measurements: Valuation Principles and Auditing Techniques (with Mark Zyla, Managing Director, Acuitas, Inc.) published by BNA in 2007.

2009 SmartPros Ltd. All Rights Reserved.

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