Two years later, Duckworth applied to the company for rehire, but the company refused to rehire him due to his "poor" attendance. The reason for Duckworth's poor attendance was that he took 52 days of medical leave in 1994 following an automobile accident which left him with a punctured lung and broken ribs. Duckworth was absent from work from June 20, 1994 to August 11, 1994, and from August 31, 1994 to September 22, 1994. Duckworth was under the care of a physician throughout the leave periods. This leave was protected leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).

Duckworth sued Pratt & Whitney, claiming that the company's refusal to rehire him violated the FMLA's provisions prohibiting discrimination for exercising FMLA-protected rights. The company conceded that at the time of the leave Duckworth was an eligible employee under the FMLA, that the company was a covered employer under the Act, and that Duckworth suffered from a "serious health condition" justifying the leave. Pratt & Whitney, however, argued that Duckworth was not entitled to file a lawsuit under the Act, because this right is limited to "employees," a term which does not include job applicants.

The district court dismissed Duckworth's lawsuit, finding that the term, "employees," in the FMLA has a "plain meaning" that refers only to current employees.

The court of appeals overturned the district court decision, finding in Duckworth's favor and reinstating his lawsuit. The court explained that this was a straightforward question of statutory construction. The FMLA delegates to the Secretary of Labor broad authority to promulgate regulations to carry out the Act, and according to these regulations, Duckworth is an "employee" who can sue for violations of the FMLA. The issue, therefore, the court said, was whether the term "employees" as used in the FMLA was ambiguous, and if so, whether the regulation interpreting the term broadly is reasonable.

The appeals court said the district court's finding that the FMLA's use of the term "employee" has a "plain meaning" excluding former or prospective employees was wrong for several reasons. First, courts have consistently regarded the term "employees" as not being limited to current employees. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that "employees," as used in Title VII, includes former employees. Third, the FMLA provides that the definition of "employee" in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is applicable to the FMLA, and the FLSA definition is ambiguous and not limited to current employees. Fourth, other FMLA provisions do not eliminate the ambiguity of the term "employees." For these reasons, the court concluded that the FMLA term "employees" does not have a plain meaning, and is instead ambiguous.

The court therefore addressed the next issue, whether the regulation which interprets the term "employee" is reasonable. The court noted that the FMLA does not specifically limit the right to sue to current, eligible employees, but instead uses terms like "any individual." This, the court concluded, was strong evidence that Congress drew a distinction between the right to take leave (granted to "eligible employees") and the right to be free of employer interference with FMLA rights (granted to "any individual"). The court also pointed to other FMLA sections which seem to support a broad interpretation of the term "employee." Accordingly, the appellate court decided that the FMLA regulation was reasonable.

The court therefore overturned the district court judgment against Duckworth and reinstated his lawsuit.

(Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc., No. 97-2244, 1998 U.S.App.LEXIS 16270 (1st Cir. July 14, 1998). 34 pages.)

Helen Norton represented Mr. Duckworth.

Richard G. Moon represented the company.

Leif G. Jorgenson, Attorney with the U.S. Department of Labor, represented the department as amicus curiae.

Catherine K. Ruckelshous, Sara E. Rios, Patricia A. Shiu, Catherine R. Albiston and Robin Runge represented the National Employment Law Project and others as amici curiae.

Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Robert E. Williams and McGuiness & Williams represented the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae.

Loretta M. Smith represented the Associated Industries of Massachusetts and others as amici curiae.